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Concerns about lying and sincerity in politics are common in most societies, as are concerns 
about conspiracy theories. But in the occupied Palestinian territory, these concerns give rise to 
particular kinds of effects because of the conditions of Israeli occupation. Political theorists often 
interpret opacity claims and conspiracy theories as responses to social disorder. In occupied 
Palestine, disorder and instability are standard. Opacity claims and conspiracy theories 
therefore require a different kind of analysis. Through an examination of the semiotic ideology 
of sincerity, especially as it has emerged in the conflict between Fatah and Hamas, this article 
argues that opacity claims act as a form of nationalist pedagogy, at once reinforcing the basic 
principles of sincerity of action and word, and encouraging a wariness of political spin.  
Keywords: Fatah, Hamas, occupied Palestinian territory, conspiracy theory, ethics 
 
 
Hypocrisy seems inherent to politics. And the conviction that most politicians are duplicitous is 
as universally shared a belief as there may be.1 This belief finds its most elaborate form in 
conspiracy theories, which also appear throughout history and across the globe. Although many 
are critical of the negative effects of this kind of cynical thinking and hypocrisy, political 
philosophers have recognized that hypocrisy itself may serve some slight positive function. For in 
pretending to be good, hypocrites may be a bit better than if they wore no mask of virtue. 
Political theorist Judith Shklar has suggested that, in condemning hypocrites, antihypocrites 
may scare politicians into improving their behavior.2 But the nature of political hypocrisy, the 
widespread fears of and beliefs in political conspiracy, and the effects that accusations of 
political lying have on a society and its political relations are clearly variable.3  
 The case of the occupied Palestinian territory shows the limitations of universalizing 
theories of political philosophy. In a place where disruption, arbitrariness, violence, and extreme 
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disempowerment have become the norm, the effects of antihypocritical discourse have come to 
produce both more and less than the mild disciplining of politicians that Shklar halfheartedly 
recognized. This article details how notions of hypocrisy, ideas about sincerity, and suspicions of 
conspiracy shape political engagement among Palestinians. I argue that talk of lying, sincerity, 
and conspiracy in occupied Palestine ultimately express concerns about social bonds and social 
solidarity, and convey lessons about whether and who to trust, with whom to have solidarity, 
and whom to believe and rely on.  
 My understanding of these dynamics is based on years of fieldwork conducted primarily 
in the West Bank over the last two decades. I draw on my interviews with people from both the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip who are of a variety of political persuasions and socioeconomic 
backgrounds. I also analyze Arabic media that circulates throughout the occupied Palestinian 
territory. Especially since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, I have observed a 
consistency in antihypocrisy discourse, through which Palestinians share their analyses of 
political talk and action, and evaluate each others’ intentions and actions. This kind of discourse 
about (in)sincerity, which is ubiquitous, is a means of asserting shared values. It manifests a 
common habit of critical thought toward the political realm that can act as a shield against 
demagoguery and dictatorship. It also provides a language for political point scoring against 
internal rivals, and reveals the fragility of a national movement that has failed to attain its goal 
of full statehood and genuine independence. But most of all, in demanding sincerity from their 
own politicians, Palestinians reassert the principle that political character, conviction, and action 
should be unitary, that nationalist word and deed should be sincere.  
Political skepticism and conspiracy theorizing in the occupied Palestinian territory are 
not products of “Middle Eastern culture,” as some (such as Daniel Pipes) have claimed.4 Rather 
they are a result of the insecurities and uncertainties of life under military occupation, in which 
those Palestinians with the most power within the broad framework of Israeli control are most 
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shielded from scrutiny. The way in which the 1993 Oslo Accords were developed in secret and to 
the detriment of most Palestinians, and the desultory performance of the Palestinian Authority 
since then, have also fueled a widespread sense among Palestinians that hypocrisy and 
insincerity are the default positions of politicians. The long-running power struggle between the 
two main nationalist factions, Fatah and Hamas, which has split the occupied territory and the 
Palestinian Authority since 2007, has greatly deepened Palestinians’ cynicism and suspicion 
towards politics. So much so, in fact, that it threatens to undermine the expectation of sincerity 
in politics, and to unravel the framework of values in which the national movement was based 
for well over half a century. 
 
Hamas versus Fatah:  Rats and Hyenas against Treachery and Duplicity  
The Palestinian national movement has always been dynamic, the product of multiple, 
sometimes contesting forces and interests. The 1980s experienced one of the movement’s biggest 
challenges with the PLO’s expulsion from Lebanon.5 The politicization and popularity of the 
Palestinian Islamist movement grew in the context of this crisis.6 After the establishment of 
Hamas during the first intifada, the Islamist movement’s influence expanded. From the 
beginning, the relationship between it and the secular nationalism of the PLO was characterized 
by competition. The more that Fatah, the major political party in the PLO, moved towards some 
kind of accommodation with Israel, the more bitter the internal Palestinian conflict became. The 
surprising victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections intensified the 
rivalry. 
 Partially an outcome of the elections, the enmity between Hamas and Fatah took on a 
new character in the summer of 2007, when brutal confrontations between the two parties broke 
out and left over one hundred dead—with several men having been thrown off rooftops—and 
one thousand wounded in the Gaza Strip. Among the wounded, many were hurt in particularly 
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violent ways apparently intended to cause maximum pain.7 Since then, Hamas has governed 
Gaza, while Fatah continues to rule the West Bank. The political and physical separation of 
these two parts of the occupied Palestinian territory has remained entrenched.  
 The acrimonious competition between the two camps has been evident in the policies 
each has pursued, such as the exclusion from government of those affiliated with the opposing 
party, and the repression of their activities within civil society.8 It has also played out in news 
and party-affiliated media, where each side accuses the other of antinationalist behavior and 
secret plots and plans.9 Within this bitter exchange of denunciation and countercondemnation, a 
shared semiotic ideology—the culturally relevant and generally shared ideas about how words, 
language, and meaning should function—is evident.10 Sincerity is at the core of this semiotic 
ideology, and serves as a fundamental principle undergirding the ethical structure of Palestinian 
politics.11   
 The Fatah–Hamas rivalry played out in two dueling animated videos that were 
circulated on the Internet in 2008. These videos exemplify the shared perception among these 
political contestants that duplicity is tantamount to antinationalism. A Hamas cartoon entitled 
“Hamas and the Treachery of Fatah” expressed the view that Fatah is corrupt and indecent, 
using the guns of nationalist fighters to oppress and swindle its own people.12 It depicts Fatah as 
a bunch of armed rats led by a cigar-smoking Muhammad Dahlan, the Fatah strongman in 
Gaza who was accused of collaborating with the CIA to orchestrate a failed coup to topple 
Hamas there.13 At the end of the cartoon, a calm, sage lion representing Hamas stomps on the 
fearful rats who scuttle away. With the Fatah rodents cleared, the scorched earth sprouts green 
anew (fig. 1).  
 An animated video that Fatah produced in response, entitled “The True Face of Hamas,” 
begins with the text, “Removing the mask from the hyenas’ faces: the true face of the Hamas 
movement,” as ominous music plays in the background.14 As the video proceeds the lion 
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representing Hamas roars and its outer skin splits down the middle, exposing a psychotically 
laughing hyena. Terrorizing children and stealing their food, the evil-looking animal moves 
through the streets of Gaza, lights going out as it passes. It tears up the flag of national unity as 
it heads to the West Bank. The video resonates with Palestinian folklore and mythology, in 
which hyenas are portrayed as malicious tricksters, capable of hypnotizing people to make them 
follow.15 At the end of the Fatah video, the hyena, after wreaking this path of destruction, 
returns to its lion mask, its green, flaming eyes glowing through (fig. 2). 
 Hypnotizing duplicity, sparkling slogans hiding a bleaker reality, monstrous hyenas in 
lion’s clothing: these condemnations are not merely utilitarian, partisan attempts to discredit the 
competition (although certainly they are partially that). In the contests of representation 
between Hamas and Fatah there is also an implicit exhortation for sincerity in politics. Such 
representations are examples of how national values, standards of political ethics, and the 
meaning of Palestinian identity are continually reaffirmed, even as faith in the people who are 
supposed to enact these values erodes with the growing evidence that they are not maintaining 
them in practice. 
 
Sincerity and Semantic Ideology 
As revealed in these animations and other media circulating in the occupied Palestinian territory, 
there is a broad concern that words should be sincere (ṣādiqa or mukhliṣa), that they reveal an 
honesty of intention and express a correlation of word and action. Sincerity is at the core of 
Palestinian semiotic ideology, evaluative ideas about how things represent other things.   
 Any semiotic ideology encompasses ideas about what kind of moral subject uses language 
in particular ways. These ideas are the substrate for value judgments that people make about 
each other as individuals or groups. Understanding semiotic ideology is therefore key to 
understanding an ethical system, the standards by which people evaluate their own and others’ 
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behaviors and dispositions as good or bad, right or wrong. Attention to semiotic ideology and 
ethics also provides insights into what animates conflict and forms the glue of political 
allegiances. It sheds light on ideas about what political actors are and should be, about how 
political actors should act and talk. Semiotic ideology in Palestine is a part of nationalist 
ideology. Nationalist ideology frames ideas of who the moral subject is, and nationalism sets the 
parameters against which the ways people speak are gauged. 
 In Palestine, according to nationalist ideology, people should be willing to sacrifice 
themselves for a greater social, national good, in solidarity with conationals and guided by 
nationalist and pure intentions. Individuals express themselves, judge, and are judged within 
that normative, idealistic framework. But once they are in the realm of politics, actors are more 
often regarded as amoral, individualistic, and power seeking. The rodents, lions, and hyenas of 
the sparring videos illustrate the shared concern with duplicity in the political realm, especially 
the duplicity of political elites (such as Dahlan). 
 If sincerity and related values have not been consistently enacted in the occupied 
Palestinian territory, there is still a common concern there about sincerity of word and deed. 
This concern has remained a predominant theme of discourse related to the interfactional battle 
between Hamas and Fatah. The value of sincerity at play in the Palestinian political realm is 
akin to the linguistic ideology that anthropologist Summerson Carr has termed “the ideology of 
inner reference,” or “an ideology that presumes that (1) ‘healthy’ language refers to preexisting 
phenomena, and (2) the phenomena to which it refers are internal to speakers.”16 In other words, 
this ideology holds that people have true feelings and beliefs in their inner self and consciousness, 
and that when language and speakers are functioning properly (according to this value system, 
or ideology), people put those inner states into words that refer directly and transparently to 
them. Language does not produce or have an effect on those states, it simply expresses them. 
 The predominant semiotic ideology in Palestinian politics shapes worries about how 
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8 
representations reflect aims, whether actions accord with pronouncements, how words reveal 
inner intentions, and how words indicate what kind of person has uttered them.17 This ideology 
is marked by a concern with transparency and opacity, with determining which words and 
actions are true and substantive or duplicitous and empty.18 The shared focus on sincerity among 
Palestinians, and their critique of opacity and duplicity, indicates that, even amidst the violent 
melee and bitter divisions, they possess a shared clutch of ideals.  
 
Opacity and Conspiracy under Occupation 
These shared ideals, often expressed in “opacity claims” about lying, sincerity, and conspiracy, 
all relate to a belief “that it is impossible to know what is in the mind of another person,” but that 
what is in the other’s mind should be reflected directly in the person’s words and actions.19 
Conspiracy theories are a particular kind of opacity claim. Conspiracy is generally defined as 
harmful action enacted deliberately and through secret planning. Scholars often analyze 
conspiracy theories in isolation from the broader context of opacity claims and without reference 
to the regnant semiotic ideology. They do not view them in tandem with the ways that people in 
a society think about how representations work or should work. But their insights into the 
functions and effects of conspiracy theory can shed light on semiotic ideology and political ethics 
more broadly. 
 Scholarly attempts to understand the role of conspiracy in politics and society are 
diverse and far ranging.20 Anthropologists have interpreted conspiracy talk as a form of 
resistance and a means of popular empowerment, a method of ethical critique, or a means of 
sustaining a “transnational imagined community” that paradoxically legitimates state power.21 
They note the prevalence of conspiracies in contexts where political decision-making is very 
hierarchical, and have analyzed indictments of politicians’ duplicity as being a means of 
challenging elites, and of understanding “the invisible workings of the global marketplace.”22 
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9 
Some scholars argue that the ironic stance that is typical of postmodernism leads to conspiracy 
theories, while others identify Christianity or Puritanism as sources for mass worry about 
duplicity and the fetishization of sincerity.23  
 It could be that conspiracy theorizing is a universal human penchant and that the 
tendency to equate politics with lying is transhistorical, but their prompts, purposes, and results 
can only be identified by considering their specific historical, political, and social contexts. 
Indeed, most anthropologists insist that the stimuli for conspiracy talk and opacity 
preoccupations are varied and specific, as are the social and political functions that they serve.24 
While ethnographic examinations highlight the apparently “nonscientific” and distinctive ways 
that people try to make sense of a world full of extreme disempowerment and violence, their 
basic goal is to grasp the underlying logic by which, in context, these seemingly paranoid 
perspectives make sense.25   
 The anthropological approach, which draws attention to the situations in which 
certain beliefs about duplicity and opacity emerge, stands in contrast to that of some political 
philosophers. Ignoring the particulars of specific contexts, Hannah Arendt, for example, believed 
that conspiracy theories are based on assumptions that the world is somehow ordered and 
orderly, and result from “reason’s aversion to contingency.”26 They emerge, in this view, from the 
need of “the masses” for consistency.27 Political lies are efficacious and accepted, she argues, 
because so often they can make the world seem more sensible and reasonable than does the truth.  
 For Palestinians who have lived only under the arbitrary rule of military occupation, 
however, it is most reasonable to expect disruption. For people whose routines are regularly 
obstructed, but in completely arbitrary and nontransparent ways, the only constant in daily life 
is lack of consistency.28 So if a hankering for reasonableness is universal, but one that is not 
experienced the same way everywhere, how does this affect our understanding of the nature and 
function of political lies and conspiracy talk? In what follows I offer some examples of how and 
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10 
why people living under Israeli occupation expect a certain level of uncertainty and duplicity as 
a norm. Israel’s arbitrarily imposed and overwhelming physical control of the occupied 
Palestinian territory and its use of collaborators are key reasons. I go on to show how public 
assessments of others’ (in)sincerity, and attempts to make sense of and see beneath duplicity, are 
also continuous features of life under occupation. In the context of the occupied Palestinian 
territory, Israel’s pervasive, but capricious control incubates a widespread wariness and political 
suspicion.  
 Opacity has a particular significance for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation. 
Those who govern the occupation make decisions behind closed doors, and those who control 
many aspects of daily life do so seemingly arbitrarily. Even the normal travels of daily life—
from town to town, from job to home—may be disrupted without warning or reason. The Israeli 
army erects “flying checkpoints,” for example, which are temporary and erratically placed. 
During the height of the second intifada, the haphazard nature of the blocks, and the 
randomness with which they were erected or monitored, kept Palestinians in a constant state of 
uncertainty. The occupation makes seizure and destruction of property an ever-present threat 
that is unpredictably implemented. As is the seizure of person. For those subject to a justice 
system in which administrative detention can leave one in prison without stated reason, charge, 
or trial, reasonableness may be universally preferred, but is hardly the expectation that Arendt 
believed to be universal.29 The only real constant in daily life is inconsistency.30 
 Pressure to collaborate and actual collaborators penetrate and seep into everyday life 
under occupation. Israel has relied heavily on co-opting Palestinians to work with them, 
especially as spies who provide information to facilitate the assassination or arrest of other 
Palestinians by Israeli forces. Israel recruits Palestinians into this role through extortion, threat, 
and trickery. In Israeli jails, collaborators extract unwilling confessions from unwitting 
prisoners. Outside of prison, Israel demands information from ill Palestinians seeking permits to 
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11 
get health care abroad.31 The widespread knowledge of Israel’s power to coerce, and the 
frequency with which Israel assassinates wanted Palestinians based on inside intelligence, 
means that the prevalence of collaborators is a well-known fact among Palestinians. As one 
Palestinian civil society activist declared, “We are an infiltrated society.”32   
 In everyday life under occupation, local mysteries are profusely speculated upon, and 
the hypotheses generated to explain them often involve the controlling hand of the Israeli 
occupation authorities. Because the decision-makers who govern the occupation are almost 
entirely inaccessible to Palestinians, and because they are in fact involved in manipulating 
people in secret ways, such as through the deployment of collaborators and undercover agents, it 
is perfectly logical and reasonable to suspect or assume the occupation’s involvement in 
mysterious happenings.33 During my fieldwork in the West Bank, several perplexing 
neighborhood events were discussed in this way. There were questions, hypotheses, and 
presumptions about who broke in to a youth center, who spread scandalous rumors about an 
aerobics class in a refugee camp, why a random youth suddenly attacked his neighbor, and why 
someone swiftly received a rare permit to travel out of the country. For my interlocutors, possible 
explanations for some of these events included the occupation’s deployment of collaborators sent 
to disrupt the empowering social and educational activities of civic activists. Given that actual 
conspiracies are inherent to the occupation, such explanations were as likely as any other.  
 Being forced to live under a wholly nontransparent, seemingly erratic regime of a 
foreign military power has produced a generalized wariness among Palestinians marked by 
unique kinds of expectations about access to the truth, and unique assumptions about how the 
world is being organized. The right to health care or the right to reside with one’s family can be 
revoked based on arbitrary, secret grounds that cannot be appealed.34 Arrest and imprisonment 
can happen on the basis of secret evidence.35 Palestinians living under occupation are 
acclimatized to, although not accepting of, the inconsistencies and whims of an oppressive 
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system.36 Their attitudes towards political power, political discourse, and the possibilities of 
opacity and likelihood of conspiracy are thus distinctive. The unwillingness to accept the 
declarations of, or expect the truth from, those in power has been ingrained through the 
experience of almost five decades of radical contingency and capricious power. What politicians 
and the powerful really mean and what they are actually doing behind closed doors is always a 
cipher, understood to be nontransparent, a mystery to be unraveled, potentially if not already 
malicious in intent and effect. 
 
Conspiracy Theory as National Bond 
The national enemy—the Israeli military authority—cannot be trusted, and its plans, actions, 
and intentions can neither be known for certain nor reliably predicted. The view among 
Palestinians that lying and obfuscation are part of what the occupiers do has been extended to 
their view of their own rulers, the Palestinian Authority, as well as political factions. Many 
Palestinians consider the Palestinian Authority to be untrustworthy. Thus, the political entity 
that came into being after the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993 and that is supposed to incarnate 
Palestinian nationalism, is seen to be full of craven compradors clinging to whatever privileges 
they can at the expense of the national good.37  
 Such analyses, discussions, and judgments occur all the time in public discourse, news 
media, and everyday conversation. Political discussion is a fact of everyday life, involving young 
and old, teachers and taxi drivers, activists and observers. Speech and the inner intentions it 
conveys or obscures, actions and the claimed or true motives that drive them, the workings of the 
powerful and the secret or revealed plans they are implementing—these are all subjects of public 
and private analysis in the occupied territory. Sometimes the extent of such discussion increases. 
 As the ethnographic record shows, conspiracy talk arises and the volume of opacity 
claims increases during periods of social upset.38 Whether by war, assassination, revolution, or 
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large-scale changes in economic structures, interruptions to the ebb and flow of normal relations 
tend to produce a need in people to make sense of their new conditions by pulling back veils and 
seeking out what really underlies things.39 When people perceive their conditions as negative, 
catastrophic to a way of life, or almost beyond imagination, anxiety about understanding and 
believing others is expressed in opacity claims.40  
 The fighting between Hamas and Fatah in 2007 provoked an intensity of opacity 
claims. The violence of the conflict and the extent to which it contrasted with previous phases of 
in-fighting marked it as particularly acute. During the internal clashes of 1983 between PLO and 
anti-Arafat forces in Lebanon, for example, the fighting was bitter but never went beyond 
“ordinary” battles and some assassinations by “conventional” means (guns, bombs). In the wake 
of the Hamas takeover of Gaza, few could recall internal violence between these adversaries 
reaching such a personalized level of sadism. It was thus a period in which values were 
intensively assessed and reasserted. Crises can provoke conspiracy talk and opacity concerns 
because of a perceived moral breakdown in society, but they also can precipitate a time of 
collective moral or political contemplation, when principles of right living become an explicit 
focus.41 The Hamas–Fatah fighting prompted an unusual number of “opacity claims” because it 
was such a stark shattering of any pretence to national unity, and such a blatant violation of the 
(rarely written but often stated) Palestinian prohibition (taḥrīm) on shedding Palestinian 
blood.42  
 During their takeover of the Gaza Strip, Hamas forces killed tens of Fatah-associated 
members of the PA security services. Among the Fatah-associated members of the PA who were 
in Gaza at the time and survived, many left with severe and disabling injuries. Some had one or 
both legs amputated after being shot in the knees at point blank range by members of Hamas’s 
Executive Force.43 One survivor from Gaza explained this social rupture to me by suggesting that 
the Hamas leadership gave their members drugs that allowed them to kill for twenty-four hours 
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14 
straight. I sat with this young man, an amputee in a wheelchair, in the cafeteria of the 
rehabilitation center where approximately twenty of the men who had found refuge in the West 
Bank were receiving treatment. I expressed my doubts about this theory, but he and the other 
disabled young men who were gathered around the table insisted it was true. What else could 
explain the venomous fury and brutal violence with which Hamas members acted?  
 Whether or not Hamas fueled their fighters in this way, the theory contains a number of 
insights. It is a moral condemnation of the Hamas leadership, which is seen to be capable of 
exploiting people and manipulating them with illegal substances that are generally believed to be 
immoral, if not religiously forbidden. It implies a deplorable level of hypocrisy on the part of 
Hamas, given their religious roots and reputation for uncorrupt behavior. It also signals the 
extent to which Hamas’s violence was perceived to be truly excessive and shocking.  
 The belief that the Hamas leadership was tricking its fighters into inhumane acts was a 
certain kind of conspiracy theory. However, unlike most conspiracy theories, in which “ordinary 
people may articulate their concerns that others, in possession of extraordinary powers, see and 
act decisively in realms normally concealed from view,” part of the focus in this story is the 
powerless: Palestinians duped by the Hamas leadership in Gaza.44 For the Palestinians who held 
this theory, which circulated beyond these injured Gazans, it was only unnatural circumstances 
or foreign substances that could explain this inhuman behavior. Such explanations of the 
national split are a form of popular political theory and ethical commentary. They reflect a mass 
sentiment that Palestinian nationalist politics is faulty, and that the political elite is to blame. 
 Many social analysts understand conspiracy theories as being symptomatic of an age in 
which knowledge that is perceived to be necessary, or which should be available, is hidden and 
controlled by those in power. Conspiracy theories are an expression of the human will to order 
and understand in conditions of social and political alienation. Anthropologist Dominic Boyer 
has pronounced them to be “a therapeutic mode of sheltering a positive sense of selfhood in the 
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shadow of a dread historical burden.”45 Similarly, conspiracy theories during the American 
Revolution have been described as rationalizations allowing people to hold on to the belief that 
“events are the conscious consequence of specific intentions and efficacious wills” rather than 
chaotic contingency.46  
 Conspiracy theory in Palestine, however, is not merely an index of some psychological 
state or an expression of fears about chaos. It also performs productive political work.47 West 
Bank accounts of the conflict in Gaza suggest that the world is not as it should be, and confirm a 
moral ideal in the process. This dysfunction that the conflict represents is seen to be rooted as 
much in the goodness of the busaṭā  (simple people, sing. basīṭ) as in the maliciousness of the 
manipulators. Conspiracy theory is also moral theory. 
 The quality of being simple, which is how Palestinians in the West Bank regularly 
describe Gazans, is often considered a positive attribute in Palestinian society. Time and again, 
West Bankers told me that “simple people,” those perceived to be uneducated, unsophisticated, 
easily persuaded, especially in isolated Gaza, were being duped by Hamas politicos. Even if the 
label implies a sense of West Bank superiority, West Bankers use the word basīṭ to describe 
someone who is simple in a good-hearted way. Someone who is basīṭ is not necessarily simple-
minded, but rather, innocently straightforward, never scheming. It is just that transparency, 
that concordance of intent, action, and belief, which those who have lost faith in politics see as 
deficient in politicians. They accuse both factions of lacking sincerity. What the West Bank 
discourse about Gaza does have in common with other attempts to comprehend power through 
conspiracy is the presumption that there is a “surface to power that can be seen through and an 
interior that can, as a result, be seen.”48 Conspiracy theory conveys an ideal of sincerity, 
reinforcing a moral preference for political action in which the surface action and words are 
transparent and concordant with interior intent.  
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Sincerity:  Conformity of Form and Content 
Although the Fatah–Hamas conflict was a popular topic in Palestine around the time of the 
“coup” in 2007, conversations about insincerity had already been common throughout the second 
intifada, which began in 2000. Everyone I knew supported the active opposition to the Israeli 
occupation that the intifada represented, but debates about the best means for doing this were 
continuous, and they highlighted the importance of sincerity in Palestinian politics. These 
deliberations were partly prompted by the highly controversial deployment of suicide bombings 
against Israeli civilians inside the Green Line.49 The militarization of the intifada was under 
scrutiny. Among the major concerns were issues of morality, military impact, and political 
effectiveness. Questions about the nationalist sincerity of the uprising’s participants also spread.  
 Some rejected how the nationalist zeal of some of its participants was being expressed, 
dismissing it as tāfih (superficial, silly). When I asked my closest interlocutors, men who had 
been leaders during the first intifada and were now keeping to the sidelines, about the goals and 
motivations of the second intifada’s militants who shot at tanks with rifles, they derided them for 
being more interested in showing off (isti rāḍ) with their guns than actually putting them to 
effective use in resisting the occupation. They surmised that while the gunmen pretended to be 
stirred by nationalist commitment, some of these men were motivated more by the hope for 
personal gain than collective liberation. Men hiding behind the guise of “nationalist militant 
struggler” (munāḍil) were involved in making money off of gun running, I was told, or using 
threats of violence in protection rackets that targeted Palestinian shopkeepers. Whether as a 
member of Hamas, Fatah, or any other faction, a fighter who used his gun for individual profit 
was engaged in self-serving behavior that ran counter to nationalist ideals of self sacrifice.50 And 
conversely, in words of praise for a political activist killed by Israel, a political leader admired 
the martyr’s generosity, and emphasized that he was a “defiant fighter … and an eloquent orator 
whose deeds matched his words.”51 
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Hamas versus Fatah 
The self-serving actions of political officials was also a common target of criticism. Hamas-
affiliated legislators accused the West Bank government of lying about budgets for the personal 
gain of individual members, and Fatah members accused the Hamas government in Gaza of 
hatching secret plans to “liberate” Gaza and unite it with Egypt.52 Although obviously a means of 
political contest, these exchanges, and specifically their emphasis on deceitful surfaces hiding 
inner malevolent intention, are just as much a form of political pedagogy as they are rhetorical 
barbs. With every denunciation of what is improper in a political foe, with every reference made 
to lies circulated in news media, ideas about what is correct behavior are reinforced and the 
audience is reminded of the importance of being wary of false promises and pronouncements.53 
 Those affiliated with Hamas regularly point to the insincerity of Fatah and the PA, and 
to the problem of being deceived and exploited by those who wear a nationalist façade that hides 
ulterior motives. In one instance discussed in an article posted on the Hamas-leaning news site, 
al-Risala (The Message), a festival organized by a Fatah organization for the mothers of political 
prisoners, ostensibly to show support for them and their imprisoned sons, was revealed to be a 
sham. The article reports that when the women arrived carrying photographs of their sons, they 
discovered the event was being staged for a film, and they felt deceived. “We became nothing but 
advertising material for a film,” one of the mothers complained. So the women left, lest they 
“become a mere device for petty amusement in someone’s hand.”54  
 While in this case the filming was literal, the Arabized English verb of “to film” is also 
used metaphorically to indicate a genre of not telling the truth—it is a euphemism for lying. To 
say that someone has filim  alayk or bi-yisawī filim (do a film on you, make a film) means that 
he has told an untrue story, has “pulled one over on you,” is making something up in order to 
deceive. In the al-Risala article, the author accuses Fatah of trying to pull something over on the 
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mothers of political prisoners, a particularly egregious offense given their importance as 
nationalist icons in Palestine.55 The nationalist form of this ceremony, complete with mothers 
holding the photos of the absent nationalist heroes, betrayed a different, propagandistic intent, 
the article suggests, threatening to make those who have sacrificed their sons and their freedom 
for Palestine into a laughing stock.  
  Beyond the dishonorable exploitation of these women, the public denunciation focused on 
the Fatah club’s aestheticization of politics, what historian Martin Jay usefully glosses as “the 
domination of rhetorical or figural over literal and sincere modes of speech.”56 In Palestinian 
public discourse there is a constant effort to push back against any attempt to let politics be 
turned into a public relations exercise, to ensure that the images floating in front of citizens 
match the reality of actions and intentions behind the scenes, and to call attention to the gap 
between the two.  
 The importance of the form–content distinction in Palestinian linguistic ideology is most 
expressively captured in the Palestinian colloquial phrases ḥakī fāḍī, empty talk, and kalām fī al-
hawā , words in the air. The phrase ḥakī fāḍī refers to meaningless talk, words without 
substance. An idiomatic American English translation of ḥakī fāḍī might be “hot air.” Just as 
someone full of hot air may speak in a puffed up way of great exploits and promise grand things, 
someone whose talk is ḥakī fāḍī is easily dismissed, not to be taken seriously, because there is no 
reality or truth to what that person is saying. Kalām fī al-hawā , like ḥakī fāḍī, are words so 
light that they can float away, making no difference in the world that they claim to represent or 
influence.  
 Anthropologist Amahl Bishara, commenting on a New York Times interview with a 
Palestinian child in the Gaza Strip, captured a perfect example of how such semiotic ideology 
functions in the context of political-ethical judgment. The New York Times journalist quoted the 
boy: “‘Peace,’ he said with scorn, ‘is a word that flies in the air.’” One of Bishara’s interlocutors 
This	  is	  the	  accepted	  version	  of	  an	  article	  accepted	  for	  publication	  in	  International	  Journal	  of	  that	  will	  be	  published	  by	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press	  in	  International	  Journal	  of	  Middle	  East	  Studies:	  
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=MEShttp://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayBackIssues?jid=
CSS	  
Accepted	  Version	  Downloaded	  from	  SOAS	  Research	  Online:	  http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22423/	  	  
 
19 
interpreted the newspaper quote, saying: “I can imagine a fourteen-year-old boy talking … and 
saying ‘peace is just talk in the air’ … It means it is not tangible. All of them talk about peace, but 
for him, for the boy, it is all in the air.”57 As Bishara observed, “‘peace’ as a theoretical term had 
little currency for many Palestinians.”58 It is a nice word promising great things. But many 
consider the so-called peace process to be just a farce. Peace has no reality on the ground.59 This 
skepticism is a result of many years of periodic negotiations coming on the back of the vague and 
unfulfilled promises for sovereignty that the Oslo Accords offered, which have only seemed to 
buy time for Israel’s expanding settlement project. 
 Although any peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians has been unimaginable for 
most in the occupied Palestinian territory for years, various leaders have promised “peace” 
between Fatah and Hamas intermittently since 2007. There have been six formal reconciliation 
agreements (and one public reaffirmation of prior agreements) between Fatah and Hamas, none 
of which has changed matters on the ground. How to restore trust between the two parties, and 
whether or not the warring factions are sincere in their desire for reconciliation, have been 
frequently expressed concerns in public discourse.60 Political analyses highlight the distinction 
between deceitful pretense and real, unified nationalism with “strong roots deep in the society.”61 
A commentator in al-Risala condemned the PA for exploiting unity as a slogan for the West Bank 
government’s own political purposes.62 He warned against any attempt by PA members to 
ingratiate themselves with the people through “pretty slogans” and “glittering expressions” that 
have nothing to do with “reality.”   
 In contrast, Hamas has asserted about themselves that there is “absolute correspondence 
between what we say and what we do,” as Hamas leader  Abd al- Aziz al-Rantisi wrote in his 
memoirs.63 As a result of this correspondence between intent and action, he continued, Hamas 
enjoys “high credibility and the people trust us.” A consistent feature of Hamas discourse is the 
contention that behind the words spoken by and visible actions of other political groups lies 
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nefarious activity designed for the benefit of select individuals. Surface talk, whether pleasing or 
simply obfuscating, is a shell that members of Fatah and the PA use to manipulate the people 
while materially benefiting themselves as individuals. In one instance, Hamas member Hasan 
Khraysha, the second deputy speaker in the Legislative Council, accused the West Bank 
Palestinian Authority of trying to create the impression that the government was experiencing a 
financial crisis so that the population would expect fewer services.64 He requested that the 
government in Ramallah communicate in a more “transparent” and straightforward manner the 
truth about the PA’s finances. And since the news station Al-Jazeera re-opened the question of 
how former Palestinian President Yasir Arafat died, with many believing that Israel had 
somehow poisoned him, Fatah and the PA have been accused of covering up the truth.65 It would 
seem from Hamas rhetoric that the PA and Fatah are committing forms of deception, engaging 
in conspiracy everywhere. 
 
Many against Hamas 
Accusations that factional and individual interests are prioritized over the shared national good 
are just as prominent in Fatah’s criticisms of Hamas, which is decried for its subterfuge and 
maneuverings in pursuit of its own party-specific political gains.66 The focus on the “true” inner 
ideology of Hamas underscores the accuser’s canny ability and, by extension, that of Fatah to 
look past the deceiving surface and see the “coup mentality which is ‘nesting’ in the heads of the 
Hamas leaders.” At the same time, it serves to condemn Hamas for its duplicity (izdiwājiyya).67   
 In Fatah’s portrayals, the antinationalist behavior of Hamas is all the worse for the 
duplicitous forms it takes. Fatah has repeatedly charged Hamas with agreeing to a unity deal in 
public and then refusing to implement its side of the bargain.68 Because “it is easy for them to 
make pronouncements in the morning and negate them in the evening,” Hamas has no credibility 
(miṣdāqiyya).69 Adam, a Palestinian General Intelligence officer in the West Bank whom I 
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interviewed, invoked the Islamic term taqiyya (religiously validated dissimulation about one’s 
faith) to describe Hamas members’ willingness to lie unabashedly to protect themselves.70 
According to this line of argument, treachery and backstabbing characterize the Islamic 
Resistance Movement, which has “revealed its true self to be one of coups and selfishness.” 
Voicing a similar sense of vindicated suspicions, a Ramallah resident and Fatah loyalist talked to 
me about the Fatah party conference being held in Bethlehem in August 2009, which he told me 
Hamas was not permitting Fatah members from Gaza to attend. He said, “There is no national 
unity. It’s not religion or politics, but the seat of power. That’s all they are after. Hamas has 
exposed its true self.”  
 Beyond the partisan editorial pages there are civil society activists and observers from 
among the general public who are convinced that the way Hamas’s members speak publicly is 
different from how they actually think and “raise their people.” They believe that it is only 
within the Islamists’ inner circle that the truth of Hamas’s motives and plans resides. A self-
identified secular Palestinian analyst of Islamism told me he was skeptical of the prospects for 
my research into Hamas. He told me, “Hamas are bāṭiniyīn [concealers, hidden].71 You don’t 
know what they really believe and you won’t find out.” As an example he pointed to Hamas’s use 
of the language of human rights, which in his view they deployed merely to placate the west. He 
observed that it was only “when the US started talking about democracy, women’s rights, and 
human rights that Hamas complied with a similar response.” Human rights activists and others 
were equally suspicious of Hamas’s manipulations of liberal discourses and projects. One NGO 
director told me that he refused to work with Hamas on a boycott campaign against Israel, not 
only because Hamas is against the secular social agenda he personally supported, but also 
because their participation “would put a good face on Hamas.” He would have been helping them 
in a ruse, not in a sincere political effort.  
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 Similar themes of insincerity on the surface and dangerous inner realities ran through 
the conversation I had with a Bethlehem-area preacher and former Hamas member, Shaykh 
Lau ay. He talked with me about the movement and the violent confrontations between Hamas 
and Fatah.  
 
The problem is with one who says, “I am Muslim and that is my frame of reference 
[marja iyyatī].” But then there is a big gap between theory and behavior. I met a 
sample of Hamas leaders in [Israeli political] prison and I saw the contradictions 
between the speech I heard and reality. A person might speak the most beautiful 
words, and I’d see him behave in a totally different way. Hamas has no credibility. 
There is lying. The truth is lost. There are two kinds of development in a person: 
development in the style of speech, and development in thinking. Hamas has only the 
former. Meaning tactics and public relations. But in reality, their thinking is the same. 
Perhaps their structure of thought is incapable of change. 
 
The shaykh and others in the Bethlehem area refugee camp where I met him condemned both 
the hypocrisy and the maliciousness that Hamas’s “beautiful words” concealed. I received a 
similar response when I remarked to a friend, Nizar, about the effusiveness of the hospitality of 
two Hamas spokesmen I had just interviewed. They had been very friendly and made a show of 
sending someone out to get sweets to offer me. Nizar shook his head knowingly, rejecting my 
naïve appreciation of this cordial behavior. He had been in political prison with one of these men 
during the first intifada. “You should have seen him in prison,” he said. “He was the most rageful, 
hateful one of them all. If you weren’t Hamas, you were loathed.” Nizar offered this experience 
as more evidence supporting his opinion of Hamas as lying and deceitful characters. 
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 Palestinians are usually intensely wary of politicians and their untrustworthiness, and 
the performative effects of talk about sincerity in such a nationalist, but divisive, context are 
politically salient.72 Given the ways in which the power of the Israeli military occupation is felt 
in Palestinians’ everyday lives—arbitrary, erratic, and obscure—one who can see beyond the 
surface of others’ speech and actions has a particular political value. The decriers who recognize 
the insincerity and fraudulence of a political contestant show themselves to be astute and, 
literally, insightful—able to see into the real, inner workings of another, and of others’ political 
plans. Such critics also position themselves as channels giving access to the interiors of 
conationals, bringing secrets into the open light where national unity can develop on a truer 
basis. In this way, anyone who demands transparency and identifies what is obscured, anyone 
who reveals the dangerous gap between surface and content in others’ politics, helps his or her 
conationals transcend the geographical, political, and even individual divisions that are a danger 
to nationalism and national solidarity. These powers and values are signaled through the 
message: “I know the inner truth of others and can help you understand, too.”73  
 
Conclusion 
As the extent of the disputatious discourse I analyze here suggests, the Palestinian political arena 
is replete with critical thinkers who are in persistent debate about the meaning and parameters 
of their nation and national movement. I characterize them as critical thinkers because they 
continuously question each other’s motives, probing why and how they resist the occupation. 
They challenge the claims of those who govern them, pushing back against the growing 
authoritarianism of the Palestinian Authority while expressing suspicion about the goals and 
methods of the political leadership.  
 This critical discourse is also a means of engaging in divisive party politics, of course, 
and sincerity talk and conspiracy theorizing do not always produce behavior directed toward the 
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common national good. Nevertheless, the kinds of metadiscourse and talk about intention that I 
have analyzed here form a common language of political contestation. The semiotic ideology that 
underlies this discourse is a core feature of Palestinian nationalist ideology, and it reflects a set of 
shared representational and moral norms.  
 This much is obvious from reactions to the attempted reconciliation between Fatah and 
Hamas in June 2014, which generated some cautious hope that unity was a possibility, tempered 
by wariness that the attempt would prove merely cosmetic. Many Palestinians commented that 
the unity needed to be substantive, “not only a ‘paper agreement’ between Hamas and Fatah.”74 
By the summer of 2015, during my latest research visit to the West Bank, little hope was evident 
any longer. Indeed, many Palestinians, especially younger ones, have turned away from politics 
altogether. One outside observer noted in 2010 that “neither Fatah nor Hamas is able to mobilize 
popular passions,” and this remains true six years later.75 Among those who are still seeking to 
make a difference by opposing the occupation and trying to improve their own political systems, 
there was disdain for the traditional political parties.76   
 Throughout all of these forms of expression, from the everyday commentary to the op-
eds and animated videos, there is a consistency of concern amidst the insults and accusations. 
The extent of the doubt expressed about others’ intentions could be read as a politically crippling 
generalized distrust. It could be a “peculiar form of cynicism—an absolute refusal to believe in 
the truth of anything” of the sort that Arendt diagnosed as being typical of totalitarian regimes. 
Systems such as these are so destructive, she grimly concluded, because they destroy “the sense 
by which we take our bearings in the real world…. And for this trouble there is no remedy.”77  
 But in the occupied Palestinian territory, conspiracy tales are a form of popular moral 
theory offering political lessons. Widespread attention to duplicity as expressed through opacity 
claims also reinforces shared principles of an ethical system, and encourages a constructive 
vigilance about political actors and political spin. In contrast to the American experience that 
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Arendt and others described, Palestinians’ attention to moments of insincerity and their 
accusations of duplicity are a protest against the substitution of image making for policy. Instead 
of questioning the very possibility of truth, the epistemology of suspicion and circulation of 
conspiracy theories reinforce sincerity as the moral ideal and political touchstone against which 
words and deeds are appraised. That the national enemy is the greatest source of uncertainty 
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Figure 1: Still from a cartoon depicting Hamas as a lion seated between the West Bank and 
Gaza.78 
 
Figure 2: Still from a Fatah YouTube video depicting Hamas.79 
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